When I led the U.S. team trying to bring peace to Afghanistan, we coined a term — “dirty reconciliation” — for the United States making a deal with the Taliban that protected our minimal security interests, while abandoning both the Afghan government and any attempt to preserve the gains made in Afghan society since 2001. The idea was purely a scenario to be avoided, not an actual strategy. But the possibility of such a deal now seems more likely.
In order to avoid a dirty deal, the United States needs to signal clearly that no separate peace with the Taliban will be possible and that the Taliban must negotiate with Kabul. Afghan President Ashraf Ghani also needs to overcome his reluctance to appointing a negotiating team than includes representatives of all Afghans who stand to lose if the Taliban come back, not just government officials.
The U.S.-Taliban talks in Doha, Qatar, center around two issues: the withdrawal of foreign troops and counterterrorism. An understanding could easily be struck covering the two points — America agrees to a timetable for withdrawal in return for the Taliban breaking definitively with al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist groups.
Many other issues need to be resolved, including the future role of the Taliban in the Afghan government, the rights of women and minorities, the Islamic nature of Afghanistan, whether the Afghan Constitution needs to be amended and the establishment of a cease-fire. President Ghani announced that negotiations with the Taliban can take place without preconditions, meaning any of these topics can be negotiated in an intra-Afghan dialogue.
Don’t leave Afghanistan without a deal
The reason for the lack of Afghan talks is the refusal of the Taliban to negotiate with the Afghan government, until after it has met its principal objective: ending the foreign “occupation.” The Taliban argue that this position is justified because earlier attempts to negotiate with the Afghan government were torpedoed by the U.S. government. But if the Taliban precondition prevails, the government of Afghanistan would be in the unenviable position of negotiating after its principal leverage (foreign troop presence) is removed. Negotiations in such conditions would most likely fail and lead to a civil war, or if they “succeed,” allow a return of the Taliban on terms that most Afghans would not want.
To his credit, lead U.S. negotiator Zalmay Khalilzad has stated that “nothing is agreed until everything is agreed,” a diplomatic phrase that means the Taliban cannot expect to conclude an agreement with America until they have resolved the other issues through an intra-Afghan dialogue.
Global News 
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